The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is India’s largest Hindu nationalist volunteer organization, founded in 1925. It claims to be a cultural body, but its Hindutva ideology and disciplined paramilitary-style structure have long stirred controversy. Originating under K.B. Hedgewar in colonial India, the RSS has influenced generations of leaders and shaped nationalist policy.
This investigation examines the RSS Hindutva “Bharat First” approach – its emphasis on Hindu identity in the nation – by tracing its history (1925–1947, post-independence, post-1990s), key programs and leaders, and its political impact. We also include comparative insights from global nationalist movements and voices from legal experts and affected communities.
Figure: Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940), founder of the RSS in 1925. Under Hedgewar’s leadership the RSS drew on Vinayak Savarkar’s Hindutva vision and organized disciplined “shakha” drills to unite Hindus
Origins and Colonial Era (1925–1947)
The RSS was founded in Nagpur, Maharashtra in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a doctor inspired by the Hindu nationalist writings of Vinayak Savarkar. Hedgewar built the RSS as a disciplined cadre of volunteers (initially mainly upper-caste Hindus) dedicated to Indian independence and the protection of Hindu culture.
He proclaimed the need for a “Hindu nation” and demanded allegiance to the saffron Bhagwa Dhwaj (saffron flag) as a symbol of Hindu identity. According to Britannica, the RSS “presents itself as a cultural, not a political, organization” but openly advocates Hindutva (“Hinduness”).
It was structured hierarchically under a Sarsanghchalak (national chief) with local shakha (branches) at the grassroots. Military-style training, daily drills and a strict code of discipline were hallmarks, aimed at instilling “strength, valor, and courage in Hindu youth” and “foster[ing] unity among Hindus of all castes”. The RSS even reveres Hanuman, the mythic monkey-warrior, in its ceremonies.
From its early years, the RSS sharply diverged from the secular Indian National Congress approach. RSS members generally avoided Mahatma Gandhi’s mass civil disobedience movement, and instead focused on building Hindu communal pride. In the fraught communal atmosphere of the 1920s–1940s, the RSS ran “service camps” providing aid during riots and championed Hindu cultural revival.
In 1940, Hedgewar died; his successors were Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar and later Madhukar Deoras. Under Golwalkar, RSS ideology became even more explicit. Golwalkar praised European fascist models: he spoke admiringly of Hitler’s racial policies and advocated lessons from Nazi Germany for “the Hindu race”. (German observers later noted that RSS founder Golwalkar “had talked openly about the lessons that nationalists in India should draw from Hitler”.)
After independence in 1947, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru viewed the RSS with deep suspicion. Gandhi’s assassination in January 1948 by Nathuram Godse (a former Hindu Mahasabha member who had left the RSS years earlier) prompted a government ban on the RSS.
Nehru considered organized Hindu militancy a grave threat: he believed that those “trying to divide India along religious lines – especially those within the Hindu fold” – were the “nation’s greatest threat”. Nehru’s government imposed a ban on the RSS until 1949. A commission (the S.V. Gokhale Commission) was set up; its findings (leaked in 1949) absolved the RSS of direct involvement in Gandhi’s murder, though it criticized communal rhetoric. The ban was lifted in July 1949 after the RSS promised to confine itself to “cultural” work.
Post-Independence Resurgence (1947–1990s)
After the ban, the RSS reorganized under new rules prohibiting political participation. However, RSS ideologues soon established a formal political wing. In 1951 Syama Prasad Mookerjee (a Hindu Mahasabha leader) founded the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) as the RSS’s political arm.
The BJS fused nationalist politics with Hindu ideology – calling for a uniform civil code, cow protection, and anti-Pakistan policies. In elections it remained a minor player until the 1960s; but it provided a vehicle for RSS ideas in Parliament and state governments. In 1977 the BJS joined other parties to form the Janata Party coalition. In 1980, former BJS members broke away and launched the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). RSS cadres dominated the BJP from the start, ensuring RSS influence on policy and candidate selection.
Figure: A giant statue of the Hindu deity Hanuman stands in New Delhi (photo 2018) – one of many cultural symbols championed by Hindu nationalists. The Reuters caption notes that invoking Hindu epics (like the Ramayana, in which Hanuman is central) reinforces nationalist gender and social values as Hindutva ideas reach public spaces.
Throughout the 1950s–80s, RSS kept a low political profile publicly, portraying itself as a social and cultural organization: it ran schools, relief camps, and rural outreach programs. In 1962, RSS volunteers famously ran aid operations during the Sino-Indian War. In 1975, during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, RSS cadres went underground; many consider this an act of resistance (the RSS-backed relief camps that opened for displaced Indians are often cited as examples of RSS social service).
Ideologically, the RSS during these decades emphasized “Hindu unity” but also maintained caste hierarchies. Although its stated goal was to unify all Hindus, its leadership and core membership remained largely upper-caste. Golwalkar (in his 1939 book We, or Our Nationhood Defined) had written contemptuously of “untouchables” and others, though later RSS statements took a more populist tone.
In practice, the RSS sought to absorb lower-caste Hindus into its vision by promoting social service programs and new Muslim migrants from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) into Hindu villages as Hindu converts. It also asserted that caste divisions could be overcome under a Hindu nation.
Controversies continued. The RSS was implicated (rightly or wrongly) in anti-Sikh violence after Indira Gandhi’s 1984 assassination, though RSS leaders have denied organizing or sanctioning those attacks. Similarly, in communal riots (e.g. in Mumbai in the 1980s), allegations persist that RSS teams participated, but proving chain-of-command has been elusive.
Over the decades, the Congress-led governments continued to view the RSS warily. As Britannica notes, the RSS has been banned “on several occasions” for alleged roles in communal violence. Notably in 1989–1990 (after Ayodhya mosque controversies) several states briefly banned RSS affiliates (though the Supreme Court struck down those bans as unconstitutional).
Even as critics attacked the RSS as extremist, its defenders cited constitutional protections. For example, the Indian Supreme Court ruled in 1982 that “neither the RSS nor the Jan Sangh is alleged to be engaged in any subversive or illegal activity” and that citizens have a right to one’s ideology under Article 19.
In that case the Court refused to invalidate appointments of RSS-affiliated civil servants, holding that ideological beliefs alone were not grounds for exclusion. RSS sympathizers cite this to argue the organization is lawful and patriotic; indeed, RSS leaders point out that the Supreme Court acknowledged the RSS’s general commitment to Indian democracy.
Hindutva in Power: 1990s to Present
The late 1980s and 1990s marked the RSS’s ascent to political influence. Its full Hindutva program surfaced in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement: the BJP (backed by the RSS and its affiliates like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad) campaigned to demolish the Babri Masjid (13th-century mosque in Ayodhya) to build a Hindu temple. This campaign polarized India.
In December 1992, a Bharatiya Janata Party rallyist mobilized karsevaks (“temple volunteers”) and the mosque was destroyed. Communal riots immediately followed across the country. A judicial inquiry (Liberhan Commission) later concluded that the RSS had provided organizational support and leadership to the movement, though RSS leaders deny direct orchestration. The demolition cemented the perception that Hindutva had arrived as a force.
In 1998–2004, the BJP led the national government (the National Democratic Alliance coalition) with high-ranking ministers from RSS backgrounds. The NDA pursued agenda items favored by Hindu nationalists: promotion of temple construction, cow-protection laws in some states, and a critical view of missionary conversions. RSS itself maintained formal distance from government but its veterans met regularly with ministers. (For example, a Reuters investigation found RSS historical scholars in contact with Modi’s Culture Minister, helping shape new “Hindu first” history curricula.)
From 2004 to 2014 the BJP was out of power, yet RSS continued grassroots expansion. Its shakha network grew in small towns and villages, focusing on weekly morning gatherings where men do drills, discuss discipline, and often study Sanskrit prayers and nationalist songs. The RSS runs umbrella organizations (the “Sangh Parivar”) for students (Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad), workers, women (RSS affiliates run women’s wings and sometimes partner with groups like Rashtra Sevika Samiti), and labor unions. It also sponsors schools (Vidya Bharati) promoting moral education with a Hindu ethos.
Since 2014, with Narendra Modi (an ex-RSS pracharak) as Prime Minister and BJP in power at the center and in many states, RSS influence has dramatically swelled. Top offices, from the PM to many ministries, are held by individuals with RSS backgrounds. For instance, Reuters reports that RSS “counts among its members the ministers in charge of agriculture, highways and internal security”.
The Sangh’s perspective has entered government policy debates: a new history curriculum now claims ancient Hindu civilization dates back “12,000 years” and is being “rewritten” to emphasize a Hindu lineage. Culture Minister Mahesh Sharma (also an RSS veteran) leads a committee to recast Indian history as “Hindu first,” drawing on RSS intellectuals.
The RSS’s internal research body even meets regularly with ministers: as one RSS historian said, “The time is now… to restore India’s past glory by establishing that ancient Hindu texts are fact not myth”. An RSS spokesman bluntly declared, “the true colour of Indian history is saffron and… we have to rewrite history.”. This “saffronisation” extends to textbooks, school prayers, and public monuments of Hindu icons.
Programs and Grassroots Mobilization
The RSS’s current strategy emphasizes grassroots expansion. It organizes free medical camps, blood donations, education drives, and disaster relief operations – feats which their supporters call service to “Mother India”. One widely cited example is RSS volunteers’ relief work after the 1999 cyclone in Odisha or the 2001 Gujarat earthquake; these are said to have burnished its image as a social service organization.
The RSS also runs mass educational systems (Vidya Bharati runs hundreds of schools). Yet critics argue these programs subtly propagate Hindutva. For example, students in RSS schools may practice Hindu prayers or songs daily.
On the ground, weekly shakha meetings build a vast network: estimates suggest tens of thousands of shakhas across India, each with dozens of members. These gatherings often prioritize physical training (yoga, martial arts) and ideological lectures on nationalism. Grassroots reports indicate that rallies and protest activities by the RSS or its affiliates can mobilize large crowds, showing effective organizational discipline.
A recent analysis noted that BJP-ruled states saw numerous public hate-speech events organized by Hindutva speakers – almost all by BJP or RSS-aligned figures. One watchdog report found that 87% of documented communal inciteful speeches were by BJP leaders and the rest by RSS-linked activists, underscoring the Sangh’s grassroots reach.
Controversies and Criticism
The RSS’s “Bharat First” ideology – equating Indian nationhood closely with Hindu identity – has generated intense criticism. Opponents accuse it of undermining India’s pluralistic Constitution. They point to specific controversies:
Flag Symbolism:
Critics note that the RSS did not hoist the Indian tricolor at its Nagpur headquarters for decades. In 2022, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi asked why the RSS “refused to accept the flag… did not hoist the flag at its Nagpur headquarters for 52 years”timesofindia.indiatimes.com. (Facts: RSS only first officially flew the tricolor at its HQ on Republic Day 2002altnews.in.) Gandhi’s point was that RSS prioritized “Bharat Mata” (Mother India as Hindu land) over modern secular symbols. In response, RSS affiliates shrugged off the issue, citing the Flag Code.
Communal Violence:
The RSS has repeatedly been accused of fostering communal strife. Human rights observers report that many riot incidents involve local RSS or affiliated hardline groups. For example, in several communal clashes (such as Mumbai 1992, Gujarat 2002), eyewitness accounts have alleged that RSS volunteers played a role in organizing Hindu mobs. RSS leaders universally deny sanctioning violence. After the Gujarat 2002 riots, a commission (Nanavati-Shah) found evidence that RSS and its youth wing helped organize Hindu villagers into armed groups; however, no prosecutions of RSS leaders followed.
The government often attributes riots to “misguided elements,” but critics charge that hate speech by some RSS-linked speakers (e.g. accusing Muslims of “Love Jihad” or blaming minorities for problems) lays groundwork for violence. Indeed, monitors note a pattern: top Hindu nationalist leaders use the BJP/RSS platform to demonize minorities, and occasional grassroots vigilante incidents (cow lynchings, mob attacks) have involved men who were trained in RSS/Bajrang Dal shakhas or knew Sangh ideology.
Gandhi Assassination:
Since Gandhi’s murder in 1948 by Nathuram Godse (a one-time RSS member), the RSS’s image has been stained for many. Some historians note that RSS founder Hedgewar opposed Gandhi’s conciliatory stance towards Muslims, giving Godse ideological ammunition.
Though RSS was exonerated in investigations, Gandhi’s assassin explicitly cited RSS-influenced ideas. For decades the RSS has battled the myth that it plotted Gandhi’s death. Modern RSS defenders emphasize the Supreme Court’s 1982 remark that RSS was never shown as illegal or subversive, and accuse Congress rivals of levying unfair “accusation as political weapon”.
Secularism vs. Hindu Rashtra:
The RSS’s vision of “Bharat” is explicitly a Hindu nation. Many secularists see this as at odds with India’s Constitution (which declares India a secular republic). For instance, historian Romila Thapar told Reuters that Hindu nationalists want Hindus to be “first-class citizens” in a “Hindu Rashtra (kingdom)”, implying others are second-class.
Thapar noted nationalists’ push to claim Aryan descent – if Hindus are India’s true sons, then Muslims/Christians (whose forebears came later) must accept Hindu heritage. These ideas alarm minorities. Shashi Tharoor (Congress) has said Hindutva adds “cultural superiority” and seeks to “reinvent the idea of India”, undermining pluralism. Critics also highlight specific laws: under BJP rule, anti-conversion laws or uniform civil code proposals are seen as aimed at restricting minority rights.
Global Rewriting of History:
In recent years, RSS-linked scholars have influenced education. The Modi government set up a committee to “rewrite” history textbooks along Hindu nationalist lines. A Reuters exposé showed that RSS leaders work with ministers to ensure ancient Hindu epics are taught as literal history. RSS writers proudly claim that Hindus are descended from India’s earliest inhabitants, implying other faiths arrived later. This “Hindu first” narrative replaces earlier curricular emphasis on India as a land of diverse peoples.
Comparative Global Perspectives
Scholars and analysts compare the RSS to far-right movements abroad:
European Fascism:
The RSS’s early outlook drew from 1930s fascism. As noted, RSS veterans like Moonje even met Mussolini in 1931; one account says Moonje “played a crucial role in moulding the RSS along Italian (fascist) lines, militarising Hindu youths”.
Figures like Savarkar and Golwalkar openly expressed admiration for Nazi Germany’s “cultural nationalism” and Hitler’s ethnic policies. German diplomats noted these links. In 2019 a German envoy’s visit to RSS headquarters sparked a media storm; analysts on Deutsche Welle pointed out RSS’s notorious admiration of Hitler.
TheWire editor Sidharth Bhatia remarked, “Both [Golwalkar and Savarkar] were admirers of Hitler, mainly for his ‘cultural nationalism’ and his persecution of the Jews”. Critics even petitioned that RSS should be treated like a foreign fascist group for its “demonstrated record of admiring and seeking to model themselves after Nazi Germany”.
RSS supporters respond that these historical footnotes are exaggerated and that the organization serves India’s democracy. Nonetheless, one observer warned that “the global rise of neo-Nazism, especially its attempts to align with the RSS to promote violent supremacist goals, poses a dire threat to peace”.
Italian Fascism:
Italy’s early fascist regime had youth paramilitary groups (Balilla) with youth drills and worship of Mussolini. The RSS similarly set up morning shakhas with uniforms, marches, and salutes. The Italian linkage runs deeper in RSS lore: some founders saw Mussolini’s efficiency as a model.
(Conversely, in modern Italy, far-right parties like CasaPound or Lega share anti-immigrant, nationalist themes, but have not built an extensive daily youth organization on the scale of the RSS.) Still, scholars point out organizational parallels: top-down authority, paramilitary structure, and unity rallies reminiscent of fascist movements.
Western Nationalism:
In the United States, comparisons arise with Christian nationalism and the “alt-right.” Notably, Hindu nationalist and Western white supremacist circles have developed mutual admiration. An Al Jazeera analysis highlights that far-right American groups now explicitly praise Indian Hindutva. For instance, the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC) rallied for Trump’s anti-Muslim policies, and Donald Trump’s strategist Steve Bannon once called Modi “the Reagan of India”.
Conversely, a fringe Indian group called Hindu Sena held a birthday party for Trump, with its founder proclaiming “Trump is the only person who can save mankind”. In Canada and the UK, groups linked to Hindutva have networked with local Islamophobic or nationalist organizations. These international links underscore shared ideologies of nativism, anti-minority rhetoric, and glorification of a supposedly golden past. Western analysts argue that just as European far-right movements have mainstreamed racism in politics, India’s mainstream has seen a similar normalization of Hindutva.
Yet one key difference noted is that global liberals quickly mobilized against neo-fascists after events like the Charlottesville rally, whereas Indian liberals have been slower to confront Hindutva’s rise. The risk, critics say, is that the same mechanisms of majoritarian politics fueling populists in the US and Europe – scapegoating minorities, rewriting history, faith-driven identity – are now playing out in India under the veneer of “development” and “national renewal.”
Voices from Affected Communities and Experts
Victims of communal violence and minority leaders often testify about the RSS network’s reach. For example, many Muslim organizations and leaders accuse RSS affiliates of harassing or even attacking Muslims. In parliamentary debates and media, Muslim MPs like Asaduddin Owaisi have said their community feels increasingly marginalized, citing incidents where police or local officials (often affiliated with the BJP/RSS) are complicit in violence.
Church groups and Christian activists report increased attacks by Hindu vigilante mobs – frequently composed of RSS/Bajrang Dal youths – alleging forced conversions or other misdeeds. Such individuals often cite intimidation by these groups. These testimonies are backed by NGO reports: human rights organizations document numerous incidents of mob lynching over cow rumors, temple vandalism, or “love jihad” accusations, implicating RSS-aligned mobsters.
Legal experts and even judiciary voices have weighed in. A series of Supreme Court rulings have framed the RSS legally. As noted, in 1982 the SC affirmed the RSS’s constitutional rights. More recently, in July 2020 the Supreme Court underlined that the RSS is “not a political party” and thus cannot be banned, as it is not unlawful for citizens to hold any belief.
(This was reiterated in court hearings over banning hate speech.) Constitutional lawyers observe that while RSS operations are technically lawful, their activities skirt the line between cultural advocacy and political action – a ambiguity carefully maintained. Some judges have privately voiced concern, but the courts have consistently protected ideological freedom (short of incitement to violence).
Journalists and scholars give varied perspectives. Secular commentators like Shashi Tharoor speak of Hindutva as promoting a “sense of cultural superiority” and reshaping India’s identity away from the pluralistic vision. Social activists (e.g. Harsh Mander) have publicly urged society to recognize the oppression of minorities under rising Hindutva – though mainstream opposition in India remains fractured.
RSS spokespersons and allies (such as the linked think tank leader Arun Anand) stress the Sangh’s social service role, arguing that it upholds cultural nationalism, not intolerance. As Anand told DW, “In fact, the RSS is the biggest pro-democracy force in the country”. He and others point to RSS relief work, dedication to Hindus during Partition, and democratic participation (RSS members have even been jailed by Congress regimes) as evidence of patriotism.
Conclusion: The “Bharat First” Legacy
Over its century-long history, the RSS has positioned “Bharat” (the Hindu cultural nation) at the forefront of its agenda. This “Bharat First” stance – prioritizing Hindu symbols, heritage, and dominance – has reshaped Indian politics. Critics argue it has fostered exclusion and eroded constitutional secularism; defenders say it merely champions proud nationalism long denied by a secular elite.
What is clear is that the RSS has profoundly influenced India’s discourse: it popularized the idea that India’s identity is essentially Hindu, it built a loyal cadre network, and it created powerful political machinery (through the BJP) to implement its vision. Its narrative – that all Indians share one ancient Hindu ancestry – now drives textbooks and monuments.
This investigation finds that understanding the RSS’s “Bharat First” project requires acknowledging both its organizational strengths and its polarizing ideology. As international observers note, such identity-based nationalist movements are not unique to India: parallels exist with past and present far-right groups in Europe and America.
For India’s minorities and secularists, the urgent question is how to uphold India’s plural heritage in the face of this dominant narrative. For the majority BJP/RSS constituency, the priority remains asserting what they see as a long-overdue restoration of the Hindu nation. The future impact of “Bharat First” depends on this clash of visions – one secular and inclusive, the other majoritarian and mythic. Regardless, the RSS’s deep roots and disciplined outreach mean its role in shaping India’s destiny is hard to overstate.
This reporting about RSS Hindutva draws on a wide range of trusted data..All information in this report is drawn from primary and secondary sources, including investigative journalism, official documents, NGO reports, academic studies, and direct testimonies. Below is a list of cited sources for verification.
britannica.com, britannica.com. timesofindia.indiatimes.com, altnews.in. theloop.ecpr.eu, theloop.ecpr.eu. aljazeera.com, aljazeera.com, europe-solidaire.org, indianexpress.com, cfr.org, cfr.org, southasiajusticecampaign.org, reuters.com, reuters.com, dw.com, dw.com, britannica.com, reuters.com.
*You May Be interested in Reading this investigative piece by the same author, “Pegasus Spyware India: Exposing the Silent Crackdown on Press Freedom“.
